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     I Introduction 
 
The Council of the European Union (Lisbon 2000) established as an objective for the 
year 2010 “to become the most competitive, knowledge-based, economy in the world”. 
One of the pillars to achieve the objective stated in Lisbon was the configuration of a 
European Space of Higher Education.  
 
Nowadays, there are many challenges which are related to  developing a European-wide 
competitive field that are not addressed in the actual Bologna Process. Among them 
there are issues related to incentives (to research and teaching activities), to university 
competition and to university funding. These topics have not been addressed from a 
European perspective yet and each Member State implements its own policies, which 
differ widely across States.  
 
Although the European university system is based on public as well as private 
universities, the latter concentrate most of higher education students in Europe. In this 
framework public universities exist as autonomous institutions which are often subject 
to regulation at the national and regional level. This regulation introduces several 
rigidities: universities are unable to affect their revenues significantly and are highly 
dependent on conditional public transfers; fixed salaries and incentives to research are 
established by public administrations instead of universities; there are significant 
rigidities to move from one university to the other for professors (due in part to non-
flexible hiring contracts) and students, etc. Altogether, university managers have 
significant restrictions to what concerns the management of one of their basic inputs, 
professors, which depends basically on rigid regulations from the governments.  
 
Given the role of public universities in research and higher education it is very relevant 
that we study to which extent these rigidities affect university performance. We think 
that a better understanding of the rigidities and inefficiencies of public universities will 
facilitate the design of appropriate mechanisms aimed at fostering R&D activities in 
Europe.  We develop a model where universities are subject to rigidities and we provide 
recommendations concerning the incentives that could be implemented in such a 
framework in order to increase results in R&D activities at public universities.  
 
Our results show that an efficient allocation of public resources across universities by 
public administrations requires: i) a combination of economic incentives to professors 
and transfers to universities, based on the abilities of the professors and the weight 
given to research by universities, should be used, ii) resources directed to universities 
should be distributed asymmetrically, and iii) incentives to professors should be 
designed relative to what they can earn outside the university. To what concerns 
university managers, we show that efficiency requires that: i) universities should 
strengthen control on the effort that professors are expected to devote to research 
activities, ii) teaching loads should be assigned taking into account the ability of the 
professors to conduct research, therefore resulting in a partial specialization of 
professors in either research or educational activities, and iii) increases in fixed salaries 
do not result in increases in research output. Summarizing, the distribution of teaching 
loads and public resources aimed at improving research output should not be based on 
uniform and rigid distribution criteria but on a measure of research productivity by 
professors.    
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One may argue that some of our recommendations seem really obvious. However, in 
spite of this we must note that at present some university managers and some public 
administrations across Europe (with some exceptions) are working in the opposite 
direction. Although there are significant differences not only amongst universities but 
also amongst schools and departments we would like to note that in most public 
universities: i) the teaching load is assigned uniformly, when reductions of teaching 
loads are implemented, as a compensation for success in research activities, they are 
rather low, ii) although most universities regulate income-generating activities of 
professors outside the university, there is a lack of interest by university managers to 
monitor professors’ activities (may be because university managers themselves are 
professors).  
 
Concerning the regional and national authorities we must remind that they establish the 
professors’ fixed salaries and they design the incentives to research. Very recently, in 
some countries (e.g. in Spain) we observe that: i) most increases in professors’ wages 
result from increases in fixed salaries, independently of any success in research or any 
improvement in quality of teaching, ii) personal incentives to researchers are very low 
compared to the income they can earn outside the university.    
 
Finally, we must note that a rational design of hierarchical structures aimed at 
delegating decision making to the most appropriate level would require that universities 
should be able to decide on the economic incentives to their professors. Rationality 
would suggest that the government transferred resources to universities and that they 
design the research incentives for their professors. Instead, we do not find this 
rationality in most public university systems. Very often university managers are not 
autonomous enough so as to design and implement incentives –not even fixed salaries- 
aimed at improving the research productivity of their professors. This decisions still 
corresponds to the governments. That is, professors must negotiate also with 
governments. This may explain the lack of competition between public universities for 
talented professors and researchers.  
 
According to this non-rational hierarchical structure of public university systems, we 
will work in a framework in which universities can only take decisions concerning to 
which activities their professors must devote their efforts. Additionally, incentives to 
research (to universities and to professors) will be designed by a public agency. 
Therefore, although public universities are subject to significant management rigidities, 
we provide some interesting policies aimed at increasing their research output. 
 
I.1 The literature 
 
There are few theoretical contributions that study the university system. De Fraja and 
Iossa (2002) and Del Rey (2000) pay special attention to the analysis of competition 
among universities. In their papers the authors consider research and teaching as an 
input in the production function for education. Universities assign their resources to 
teaching and research activities and they compete in order to attract most talented 
students. However, they assume that all universities receive the same resources and do 
not consider the possibility that research might generate additional funding. Instead, we 
consider that research is an income-generating activity. 
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A different approach is followed in Beath et al (2003). Their paper is in line with the 
theoretical findings on multi-task principal-agent problems in Hölmstrom and Milgrom 
(1991a, 1991b), Dewatripont et al (2000) and Laffont et al (2002). In Beath et al (2003) 
the authors study the links between universities and industry. They develop a model in 
which the university wants to encourage professors to engage in income-generating 
activities. Therefore, the problem for the university is to determine the optimal tax that 
they should impose on applied research and consultancy income.  
 
There are two main differences in our paper with the paper by Beath et al (2003). First, 
they ignore teaching as an activity while we assume that teaching is an essential activity 
of professors. Second, they assume that all time available for doing applied research (or 
consultancy) will generate some revenues to the university. Instead, we assume that the 
professor can devote his or her time to some activities that do not contribute to increase 
university’s revenues and reputation. Our focus is on the interest of universities in 
raising revenues –and prestige- by encouraging professors to engage in research 
activities considering that they are subject to some educational responsibilities, in a 
framework in which universities cannot monitor the effort that professors are expected 
to devote to research.  
 
In the next section we describe the model with three groups of agents. In the third 
section we study the interactions amongst the three groups and we analyze the 
incentives that might be implemented by the public administration in order to foster 
research activities in public universities. Finally, section four summarizes the 
conclusions. 
 
II The model 
 
In this paper we consider the role played by three different groups of agents: i) public 
administrations, ii) university managers, and iii) professors.   
 
In each group agents have some interest in research output. However, they have 
different goals and different instruments to foster research activities. 
 
First, professors decide the optimal allocation of efforts among different activities 
aimed at maximizing their utility, which depends on income and research output.  We 
must stress that we are modeling the behavior of a professor who is already working at 
the university. Therefore, we are not analyzing the market for academics.  
 
Second, university managers decide how much effort professors should devote to 
research and teaching in order to maximize both university revenues and prestige. 
University managers cannot offer any pecuniary incentive to professors. Instead, they 
fix a canon on professor’s income generating activities and they decide the time that 
professors can devote to teaching activities.  
 
Finally, a public agency decides on the optimal allocation of public resources among 
universities and professors in order to maximize research output. Therefore, the public 
agency is the only institution that fixes the pecuniary incentives to research that can be 
directed to universities and professors. According to this model, only the public agency 
finances higher education and research activities. Although this assumption might not   5
seem reasonable, we emphasize that by using it we try to reflect the real situation in 
most public university systems. 
  
We want to show that the optimal design of instruments aimed at maximizing research 
output must consider the role played by each agent and the interactions among these 
three agents. We highlight the need to pay attention to the career options that professors 




We assume that there is a single public agency that finances the K universities that are 
located in its jurisdiction.  
 
Public financing has two different components. On the one hand, the public agency 
distributes a reference budget, assigned considering educational responsibilities
1 
(denoted by Dj) and the number of professors in each university. In this paper we will 
not analyze the allocation of this generic component across universities. On the other 
hand, public authorities distribute another substantial amount of resources assigned 
across universities and professors according to some measure of professors’ research 
productivities. We will focus our analysis on the allocation of these resources. 
 
The public agency has two alternative instruments to allocate those resources aimed at 
increasing research output. We make this distinction because public agencies usually 
must choose between incentives directed to professors or to universities. Alternatively, 
they can use them simultaneously. The relevant question is whether it is more efficient 
to incentive universities rather than professors or both. 
 
On the one hand, the agency can implement direct monetary incentives to professors 
(we call them personal incentives and they are denoted by srji) according to a measure of 
their productivity. On the other, the agency can use an instrument that is directed also to 
professors but which can be “taxed” by the university. We introduce this possibility 
because it is very common in public universities that university managers fix a canon on 
the research income generated by its professors (research projects, public contracts, etc). 
We call them university transfers (we denote them by wrj) and we assume that the 
university can fix a canon on these resources (τ). We must note that if the university 
fixed τ=1 this would be equivalent to a direct transfer from the public agency to the 
university. 
 
G denotes the amount of resources that will be transferred to universities and professors 
according to a measure of the productivity of professors: Rji. The public agency has the 










=+ ∑∑  (1.1) 
  
Rji is the research output produced by professor i in university j. There are K universities 
and in each university there are Nj professors (which is considered as exogenous).  
                                                 
1 This generic component could also contain some transfers associated to ground support for research.   6
 
The public agency knows that research output produced by professor i in university j 
depends on the time that he/she devotes to research activities (trji), and his or her ability 
to conduct research (µji)
 
      
 
β µ rji ji ji t R    =  (1.2) 
 
with 0< β ≤ 1. The decision on trji depends on the university managers and the professor 
and it might be affected by the public agency’s decision on wrji and srji. In fact, the 
design of wrji and srji is aimed at affecting trji 
 
We understand that assuming a deterministic relationship between time and research 
outcome is a strong assumption. There is a random component in this relation so that 
time devoted to research does not necessarily generate research output. However, we 
restrict our moral hazard problem to the case in which the public agency and the 
university cannot control to which activities professors dedicate the time that they are 
expected to devote to research. 
 
The problem faced by the public agency is to choose the optimal combination of 





























∑∑  (1.3) 
In order to make the decision process more tractable, sections III.2.a and III.2.b deal 
with two different problems separately. First, the agency must choose between 
university transfers and personal incentives. That is, the agency must decide whether to 
incentive professors or universities, or both. Second, assuming that the university fixes a 
canon τ=1 (this implies that transfers from the public agency go to universities) we 
analyze the optimal distribution of university transfers across universities. That is, the 
agency will decide whether to distribute such transfers uniformly or to distribute them 




The university provides two products: research output and education to students.  
 
Although education is one of the main responsibilities of universities, in this paper we 
do not analyze any issue related to the provision of education (quality of education, 
student selection, fees, etc). We focus on the instruments that universities may 
implement in order to encourage professors to engage in research activities during the 
time that they are not teaching. 
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There are two reasons why research activities are important for universities. The first  is 
that research is an income-generating activity due to the canon fixed on research income 
earned by professors. The second reason is that the prestige of a university depends, 
among other things, on the research output of its professors. We model this by assuming 
that the university is interested in producing research output independently of the 
income that might be  raised from that activity
2. In this paper we assume that the 
university is interested in maximizing revenues and prestige. 
 
The objective function of university j follows: 
 
  ( , )                         with  >o. jj j j jj UIR I R ϕ ϕ =+  (1.4) 
 
where  φj measures the importance of research output to the university. With this 
specification the university might decide that the professors devoted some effort to 
research activities even when there are no revenues associated to them.  
 
Ij denotes net income received by the University j that follows: 
 
  ()    ()   -    jj d j SD SR wN +  (1.5) 
 
The university has two different sources of revenues. On the one hand, it receives 
transfers from public administrations. We could associate these transfers to a generic 
and direct subsidy to the university that depends on educational responsibilities (Dj). In 
this paper we consider these responsibilities as fixed and we do not focus on the funding 
system that determines the amount of resources that a university receives
3. The 
university uses these revenues to cover costs. S(Dj) represents public transfers net of 
costs, except professors’ wages, that are treated separately. We assume that 
 
() 0 jd j SD wN − ≥                    (1.6) 
 
The university employs Nj professors at a wage wd. Therefore, wd N j is the total cost of 
its professors. wd denotes the fixed salary paid to a professor, which is the same for all 
professors and it is considered as exogenous to university managers. We assume that Nj 
is exogenous to the model.   
 
On the other hand, the university obtains additional revenues (denoted by S(Rj)) by 
taxing the income that professors earn from their research. We assume that the 
university fixes a canon (τji) on the income earned by each professor (wrji Rji) from his or 
her research.  
 










=∑  (1.7) 
                                                 
2 Reputation may have a direct impact on university revenues because it is a crucial variable to attract 
students and because it allows universities to increase private funding. However, in this paper we avoid 
dealing with this issue. 
3 That is why we do not introduced S(D) in the problem faced by the administration.   8
  
The university knows also that the research output of any of the professors depends on 
the ability of professor i to undertake research (µji), and the effort that the professor 
devotes to research:  
 
 
β µ rji ji ji t R    =  (1.8) 
 
In brief, the problem faced by the university is: i) to decide the effort that each of the 
professors devote to both teaching and research, and ii) to decide the optimal canon on 
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Where  T is the total amount of time that professors are expected to work at the 
university and T-tdji is the time available for undertaking research or consultancy. tcji 
denotes the effort that the professor might devote to activities that cannot be monitored , 
and therefore taxed, by the university. When the university can monitor professor’s 
activities tcji will be zero. We assume that each professor devotes the same time to the 
university.    
 
According to our specification, the university cannot use direct monetary incentives to 
encourage professors to devote some of their time to research. Universities use two 
alternative instruments. On the one hand, the university decides the time that professors 
allocate to teaching activities (this time comes at the expense of the time that they can 
spend on research). On the other hand, the university decides the canon on income 




We work in a context in which professors might do several activities. In this paper we 
assume that a professor i at university j may devote the time he or she is expected to 
spend at the University to three alternative activities: i) research (trji), ii) dissemination 
of knowledge –teaching- (tdji) and iii) additionally, we assume that the professors can 
dedicate some of their time to corporate consulting
4 (tcji). Each individual is supposed to 
have an exogenously determined endowment of ability both to do consultancy (denoted 
φ ji) and to do research (denoted by µji). 
                                                 
4 We could also assume that they could devote some time to university management. However, we will 
not consider these activities in our analysis.   9
 
Both research and consultancy are income-generating activities. However, there are 
significant differences between the two. We assume that research income (derived from 
applied research or technical assistance to public or private institutions) is under the 
control of the university
5 and that university managers might decide to fix a canon on 
those revenues. Alternatively, consultancy refers to those activities that the professor 
might develop without control of the university (e.g. working in his or her own firm or 
teaching occasionally in other universities). These activities are canon-free given that 
they cannot be monitored. 
 
The time that the professor must allocate to teaching is fixed by university managers 
and it is taken as given by professors. Therefore, the decision of the professor concerns 
only to the time available for doing research and consultancy (T*-tdji) where T*- tdji≥0.  
 
T* can be considered as the amount of time that the professor is going to dedicate to his 
or her job at the university (we assume it is the same for all professors). For simplicity 
we assume that T* is exogenous (although it is the solution to a leisure-consumption 
problem) and that there is a coincidence between T* and T (the time that the university 
expects that the professor will devote to teaching and research activities). 
 
Therefore, the time constraint faced by the professor i is  
 
T-tdji=trji+tcji                                         (1.10) 
 
A professor’s utility function u(yji, Rji), where yji is income and Rji is research output, 
follows 
  ( , )         ,         with  >o. ji ji ji ji ji ji Uy R y R ε ε =+  (1.11) 
where  ε measures the importance of research to the professor. As long as εji≠0, 
professors are motivated to engage in research even if there are no rewards to research.  
 
We consider four different sources of income: i) a fixed salary wd that is the same for all 
professors, ii) net income earned from research [wrji (1-τji)Rji], iii) consultancy income 
(wc Aji) and iv) personal incentives offered by a public agency (srji) which depend also 
on a measure of research productivity and are not taxed by the university. For simplicity 
we assume that both wrji and srji are public transfers. Therefore, income follows: 
 
  (1 ) . ji d rji ji ji c ji rji ji yw w Rw As R τ =+ − + +  (1.12) 
 
Aji denotes consultancy output that depends on the amount of effort devoted to this 
activity and on the professor’s ability (φ ji). Aji follows 
                     
  ji ji cji At
α φ =  (1.13) 
 
Research output follows: 
 
                                                 
5 Quite often public universities determine that some activities (e.g. applied research or technical 
assistance to public or private institutions) must be under university control and they fix a canon on the 
income obtained by the professor. Also, some universities fix a canon on income obtained by professors 
from research projects.   10
 
β µ rji ji ji t R    =  (1.14) 
 
For the sake of simplicity, we impose that the productivities of time devoted to 
consultancy and to research be the same, that is, α=β.  
 
According to the specification in (1.13) and (1.14) research and consultancy outputs 
might be zero for µji=0 or φ ji=0, respectively. In these two instances we might find 
corner solutions for trji and tcji . However, as long as a professor has some ability in 
doing research, he or she will devote some effort to it. 
 
We assume decreasing returns to the time spent in any of the activities. Therefore, we 
assume  0<β<1. For β=1 we would derive corner solutions. This means that the 
professors might choose trji= T-tdji and tcji=0 or tcji= T-tdji and trji=0 regardless of the 
abilities being positive. 
 
Summarizing, the problem faced by the professor i is to decide to which activities he or 
she is going to allocate his or her time in order to maximize his or her utility: 
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For simplicity, the previous problem is based on some restrictions that derive from 
working in a static framework. This has several implications. First, wd does not depend 
on the number of years the professor has been working at the university. Second, the 
fixed salary does not depend on his or her ability to conduct research or on his or her 
research output. However, in most public universities there are different categories of 
professors each of them with a different fixed salary that depends somehow on 
professor’s research productivity. Third, we do not consider the possibility that the 
professor improves his or her abilities by investing on education.  
 
The professor’s decision depends mainly on the university’s capacity to monitor the 
time that he or she is expected to devote to research. In case of perfect monitoring, the 





In this section we present the results that derive from the analysis of the interaction 
among all agents. 
 
Given that the optimal decision by the public agency depends on the relationship 
between professors and universities, we will first analyze that relationship. We analyze 
the interaction between professors and university managers taking as given any kind of 
economic incentives decided by the public agency.   11
We then analyze the role played by the public agency, who takes into account the 
previous relationship. We analyze two different sets of policies. First, we study the 
optimal composition of economic incentives to research. The public agency must 
choose between direct -and canon-free- incentives to professors and transfers that can be 
taxed by the university. Second, assuming that the university could expropriate all 
professors’ revenues associated to research (which occurs under the assumption of 
perfect monitoring), we study the distribution of resources across universities by the 
public agency.   
 
In the following sections we restrict our attention to the case of decreasing returns to 
scale. 
 
III.1 Universities and professors: teaching versus research. 
 
We study the distribution of the teaching load among all professors and the decision on 
the canon that the university is going to implement.  
 
We consider two alternative hypotheses. First, we assume that the university can   
monitor the effort that the professor is expected to devote to research and to teaching. 
This is equivalent to assuming that the professor cannot dedicate any  time to 
consultancy. Second, we work under the assumption that the university can only 
monitor the effort that its professors devote to teaching, but that it cannot monitor their 
research efforts effectively. 
 
 
III.1.a Perfect monitoring 
 
In this framework there are no activities alternative to research, therefore the canon has 
no effect on the professor’s decision concerning the time he or she is willing to devote 
to research. That is, tcji=0 and trji=T-Tdji. Additionally, in this situation the optimal 
canon would be τ=1, which means that transfers to professors through wrji are equivalent 
to university transfers 
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The effort that professors in university j should devote to research that maximizes the 
objective function follows 

















Under the assumption of heterogeneity of abilities, the previous solution indicates that it 
is optimal for the university to assign the teaching load according to the abilities that the 
professors have in producing research output. The larger the abilities, the lower the 
teaching load should be. Additionally, the larger the level of income generated by the 
professors the larger the efforts that the professor will be asked to devote to research. 
This does not mean that professors with some ability to do research will not teach. This 
depends on T (the number of hours they can work), on the aggregate teaching load (Dj), 
on the number of professors, and on the number of professors with no abilities to do 
research. 
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          (1.18) 
 
This expression indicates that professor i will be able to devote more or less time to 
research, of all available time for research [NjT-Dj] and in comparison with the other 
professors, depending on the relative contribution of his or her research to the objective 
function of the university. According to the previous equation, distributing the teaching 
load uniformly is not efficient unless there is no heterogeneity of agents.  
 
In this framework it is important to stress the role that the public agency could play. In 
this framework professors cannot devote their time to consultancy, therefore there is no 
need to design direct economic incentives for them. The public agency cannot change 
the professor’s decision through direct economic incentives because in this framework 
personal transfers (srji) would not have any impact on their decision, not even on the 
university’s decision.  However, as we see in (1.18) the allocation of research incentives 
across universities {wrji, i=1…Nj} by the public agency will affect the relative 
distribution of teaching and research loads to professors. 
  
III.1 b The university cannot monitor the effort that professors are expected to 
devote to research.  
 
In this situation, the problem for the university changes slightly. We assume that the 
university can only monitor the effort that professors should devote to teaching but not 
the effort that professors are expected to devote to research. Therefore, the university 
has to consider that professors can assign –without the university’s notice- some of their 
available time for research to alternative activities such as external consultancy. 
Therefore, the decision by the university must be taken considering the optimal decision 
of professors regarding trji and tcji and particularly how the canon might affect their 
decision. We must then compute the professor’s optimal decisions first. 
   13
Taking from granted heterogeneity across individuals, we assume that the university 
could also establish  a different canon for each professor.  
 
The professors’ optimal decision is obtained by solving the problem stated in (1.15). 
The professor takes wd, srji, wrji and τji as given.  
 
Under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale (0<β<1) taking first-order 
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  T-tdji=trji+tcji  (1.20) 
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 (1.21) 
 
According to the expression in (1.21) we observe that the time that the professor will 
effectively devote to research depends on his or her relative abilities in each of the 
activities, on the earnings received from each activity and on the importance that 
professors give to research. In particular, we observe that trji depends: i) positively on 
his or her ability to work in research, and ii) negatively on his or her ability to work in 
consultancy.  Not surprisingly, the canon fixed by the university has a negative effect on 
the effort that the professor will devote to research. Additionally, as long as the 
difference between earnings from consulting activities with respect to those from 
research increases, the effort devoted to research decreases. Finally, as expected, 
increases in the amount of fixed salary (wd), do not affect the professor’s decision on trji. 
 
From equation (1.21) we see that if the professor has some ability in research (µji≠0) and 
(εji≠0), he or she will always devote some time to it even if there is no income attached 
(e.g. for wrij=0 and srji=0). This means also that even if the canon fixed by the 
university was (τji=1) he or she would still devote some time to research. However, the 
professor will undertake some consultancy only if he or she has some ability (φ ji≠0) 
and he or she receives a compensation for it (wc≠0). Therefore, under the assumption of 
decreasing returns, corner solutions depend on the abilities of the professors in each of 
the activities and on the returns associated to them. 
 
Once we know the decision by the professor, the problem for the university becomes 









         [  ( )       -      ]     
. 
      ,  with  0 1
     with   fixed, 














j dji rji cji
ii i
r




















** , ji cji t
 (1.22) 
 
t**rji and t**cji correspond to the decision taken by the professor in case of non-
monitoring. These values correspond to expressions (1.21) and (1.19). 
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 (1.24) 
 
Apparently, there is no difference between equation (1.23) and (1.17), except to what 
concerns the canon that the university is going to fix.  In this section, the optimal canon 
is not necessarily τ=1 because university managers must take into account the 
professors’ reactions to τ.  However, this equation suggests that for a positive canon 
(0<τ<1), the university’s decision on professors’ optimal research efforts would be 
lower than the one in the previous situation, as expected. 
 
Expression in equation (1.23) suggests also that the university should distribute the 
teaching load according to the professor’s abilities. However, the optimal decision still 
depends on the optimal canon.  
 
After some computations with equation (1.24) and using the implicit function theorem 
we find
6 the relationship between the optimal canon and each of the parameters 
(keeping the other parameters constant): 
                                                 
6 Computations to find these relationships have been carefully revised and are available to readers upon 
request.   15
 
 
* (,,,,,,) ji rj j rj ji ji c ji fw s µ w τ ϕε φ
+− + ++− −
=  (1.25) 
 
Although we cannot find  an explicit expression for the optimal canon and for the 
effective effort that will be devoted to research (trji
***), considering the expression in 
(1.24) and the relations contained in (1.25) we can conclude that   
 
 
*** ( ,,,,,,) rji rji j rji ji ji c ji tg wsµ w ϕ ε φ
+ + +++−−
=  (1.26) 
 
In (1.26) we present the relationships between the research effort that the professor will 
effectively devote to research and each of the parameters (the other parameters 
remaining constant). These relationships suggest again that the university should not 
assign teaching loads uniformly. Instead, it should consider the individual 
characteristics of the professors: professors with higher abilities and with higher 
motivation to undertake research should have lower teaching loads, while professors 
with lower skills for research and more ability to undertake consultancy work should be 
assigned greater teaching loads. That is, the university should favor a partial 
specialization of professors into research and teaching activities 
 
To what concerns the role played by the public agency, equation (1.26) suggests that 
any positive variation in wrj or srj would increase the time that professors would devote 
to research. In this framework we see that both instruments affect positively both 
university’s and professor’s decisions. However, the impact of both instruments might 
be different. In the next section we analyze the decision on wrj and srj by the public 
agency.  
 
Under some particular assumptions we can derive some additional results.  
 
If a professor’s ability for consultancy is zero (that is forφ ji=0) or if he or she does not 
earn any income from this activity (wc=0), this professor devotes his or her non-
teaching time to research, and the university will decide τ=1. In this case the solution is 
the same as in perfect monitoring (see the expression in 1.17), as expected.  
 
Similarly, if the professor’s ability to do research is zero (µji=0) then it is optimal for the 
university that professors devote their efforts to teaching exclusively. In this situation 
the university does not fix any tax. 
 
Summarizing, although in this framework university managers cannot implement 
economic incentives to professors but still they can take some decisions to improve their 
professors’ productivities. They will do so mainly through the distribution of the 
teaching loads and the canon implemented on research income. Finally, we want to 
stress that our results depend crucially on the assumption that the university has perfect 
information on professor’s abilities.  
   
III.2 The role of public authorities: public incentives to research activities in public 
universities. 
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This is the last step in our decision process. In this section we analyze the determinants 
of an optimal distribution by the public agency of a budget aimed at maximizing 
research output in public universities. The public agency must decide to incentive 
professors and/or universities. In order to do so, the agency must consider university’s 
and professors’ optimal decisions that were provided in the previous sections. 
 
We will analyze two different problems. First we analyze the optimal combination of 
personal incentives and university transfers. Second, we study the optimal distribution 
of resources among universities.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that professors at the same university have the 
same abilities. This means that we are assuming:  
,     ,        for    in university  ji j ji j ji j ij ε εφ φµ µ === ∀ . 
There is however, heterogeneity among universities. Therefore: 
,     ,        for  jk jk j k jK ε εφ φµ µ ≠≠≠ ≠  
Under the expression for aggregate research output follows: 
 
1
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ß ß
jj r j i j j r j
i
R µ tN µ t
=
== ∑  (1.27) 
 
III.2.a Personal income incentives to professors (sr) versus university transfers (wr) 
 
In this section we analyze the decision of the public agency on wrj and srj aimed at 
increasing the research output by the professors at university j. The public agency will 
decide considering the decisions by the professors and the universities in a framework 
with non-monitoring. Needless to say that under perfect monitoring the agency would 
decide that srj=0, because there is no need to motivate the professors with canon-free 
incentives given that they cannot devote their efforts to alternative activities.  
 
In (1.26) we have seen that both instruments affect the effort that the professor will 
effectively devote to research positively. However, these efforts differ because the have 
different impacts on universities and professors. 
 
The tractability of the model requires that the agency considers τ*j as given, analytical 
results cannot be derived otherwise. This means that the public agency does assume that 
the university managers will not change τ*j once the public agency’s decision has been 
taken. 
 
The problem faced by the public agency is to find the optimal allocation of personal and 
university transfers in order to maximize the university’s research output.  
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rj is the university’s optimal decision on the effort that professors will devote 
to research activities effectively, considering that there is no perfect monitoring (it is 
derived from problem 1.22). τ*j  is the optimal tax that it is be implemented by 
university j. G is the total incentive that is going to be implemented per unit of research 
output. 
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rj. However, after some 
computations with equation (1.30) and using the implicit function theorem we find  
 
 
* (,,,, ) j rj c j j j j sf wµ φ ϕε τ
+ +− + − +
=  (1.31) 
and 
 
* (,,,, ) j rj c j j j j wf wµ φϕ ετ
− −+ − + −
=  (1.32) 
 
As we can observe in (1.31), when designing incentives to professors, the public agency 
must consider the professor’s ability in consultancy work and the income that a 
professor could earn from this activity: the greater the abilities and the income the larger 
should the personal transfer be. However, optimal personal transfers depend negatively 
on the professor’s ability to conduct research: the larger his or her research abilities, the 
lower the need to incentive him or her and resources could be partially directed to 
universities. The opposite is true regarding w
*
ri . 
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The public agency takes into account also the canon that the university fixes on the 
income generated by the professor: the larger the canon, the larger the amount of 
personal transfers. This occurs because the public agency is compensating the 
disincentive that the canon causes on the professor’s decision to conduct research. 
 
Altogether, the public agency’s decision on personal and university transfers considers 
the opportunity cost of the professor of devoting efforts to research instead of to 
consultancy.  
 
Finally, another interesting implication from (1.32) is that the decision of the public 
agency depends also on how important is research for professors and universities 
regardless of the income that they might obtain from that activity. The more willing the 
professor is to do research regardless of the income he or she might obtain, the lower 
the personal transfer will be. On the contrary, the larger the non-income effect of 
research output for the university, the lower the optimal amount of university transfers 
is. Therefore, the agency should favor the agent with a lower propensity to do research 
without being remunerated.  
 
III.2.b Differentiation versus uniformity in the distribution of resources across 
universities.  
 
In this section we are interested in analyzing the distribution of incentives across 
universities. The agency must decide the size of the incentives (wrj) that each university 
receives. It may decide either to differentiate between universities (may be 
concentrating all resources in one university) or, alternatively, to distribute them 
uniformly. 
 
In order to do so, we assume that universities can monitor the activities of their 
professors.  We saw that under perfect monitoring the optimal canon the university will 
fix is τ=1. This means that although transfers are directed to professors, this is 
equivalent to transferring resources to universities, because they expropriate all of 
professor’s revenues through the canon. Given that incentives to professors do not affect 
university’s decisions, we can assume that sri=0.  
 
There is another important assumption to be remarked. We assume that universities are 
not subject to teaching loads; that is, restriction Dj=Σ
Nj
i=1 tdji in problem (1.16) does not 
apply. Still, we maintain the time constraint for the professors. Without this assumption 
the problem of the agency would not make any sense because the distribution of time 
for research activities by universities would not depend on wrj. Due to the homogeneity 
assumption, see equation (1.18), the time that the university would decide that the 
professors should devote to research follows  
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                        (1.33) 
The efforts that professors would devote to research depend only on the number of 
professors in that university and the aggregate teaching load.  
 








=∑  (1.34) 
where G is the amount of  resources that the agency wants to devote to incentive 
research per unit of research output. Therefore we do not consider any restriction 
regarding the aggregate amount of resources that could be devoted to this program. 
  














































rj is the optimal decision by the university in case that the aggregate teaching load 
restriction does not apply.  
 
For simplicity, we assume that there are two universities only and that they have the 
same number of professors (Nj=Nk).  
 
The solution depends crucially on the value for the parameter β. On the one hand, for 
β=1/2 we find a corner solution. The allocation of transfers follows the condition: 
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We also find corner solutions as far as µj=0 or  µk=0 . In both situations the public 
agency would transfer all resources to one university. 
 
 
However, it is important to remark that in this context allocating all transfers to one 
university j does not imply that professors in the other university k do not conduct 
research, as long as φk in that university k is not zero. This result implies that research 
will be conducted also in the university with the less productive professors but that this 
university will not receive any transfers. All transfers would be directed towards the 
university with the most talented professors.  
 
On the other hand, if the parameter β ≠ 1/2, then the solution to the problem provides 
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Although one may expect that the agency should always favour the university in which 
professors are more talented for research, this is not always true. It depends on the value 
for β. 
 
As we can observe in equation (1.39), for β<1/2, the public agency will transfer more 
resources to the university with the most talented professors. That is, the larger the 
talent of the professors at university j, the larger the amount of transfers that this 
university will receive per unit of research output. On the contrary, for β >2, the public 
agency will transfer more resources to the university with the less talented professors.  
 
Additionally, the larger the propensity of a university j to obtain research output 
regardless of the income retained from that activity, the lower the transfer is. This is due 
to the fact that university j is highly motivated to conduct research relative to k so that 
incentives should be directed to university k.  
 
Another interesting result is that in equilibrium the ratio of efforts allocated to research 










β − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
 (1.40) 
 
The previous expression indicates that in equilibrium, as far as µj≠µk, professors in both 
universities will devote different amounts of efforts to research. We must note that these 
differences remain after the intervention of the public agency and they are not due to 
differences in the number of professors of differences in aggregate teaching loads, 
which have not been considered in this section. Therefore, the distribution of public 
transfers across universities is favoring that professors in one and another university 
devote different efforts to research, according to their capacities.  
 
However, differences in the abilities of the professors will translate into more or less 
differences in their efforts devoted to research depending on the value of the parameter 
β. If β <1/2, larger differences in the abilities of the professors doing research at 
university j with respect to those at university k will imply larger differences in the 
efforts that those at j will devote to research. Alternatively, if β >1/2 larger differences 
in the abilities of the professors doing research at university j with respect to those at   21





In this paper we find two sets of conclusions. 
 
On the one hand, we provide the decisions that can be implemented by university 
managers in order to maximize income and research output at their university. Although 
those recommendations are associated to management issues, they are important to what 
concerns the generation of research output by professors. 
 
First, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring frameworks, universities should 
assign teaching loads to the professors asymmetrically, according to their abilities in 
conducting research. This result suggests that professors should specialize either in 
research or in teaching. Uniform distributions of teaching loads are rather inefficient 
because they reduce the revenues that the university can obtain from research activities. 
 
Second, in case of lack of monitoring of the efforts that professors are expected to 
devote to research, universities should strengthen control on the efforts that professors 
could devote to those activities that do not provide any additional income to the 
university or any impact on university’s prestige. Otherwise, the reduction of teaching 
loads aimed at increasing research output by professors could end up generating only 
private income to professors. 
 
Third, in case of non-monitoring, universities should fix their canon on professor’s 
income-generating activities taking into account the negative effects of that canon on 
the efforts that professors might be willing to devote to research rather than to 
consulting activities. As far as the canon increases, there is an increase in the relative 
income obtained from consultancy and this makes research activities less attractive. 
 
On the other hand, we provide some hints on the policies that could be implemented by 
the public agency in order to maximize aggregate research output at universities. The 
public agency should use a mix of incentives to professors and to universities. In doing 
so, the agency should consider: 
 
First, the fact that universities can or cannot monitor the efforts that professors are 
expected to devote to research activities. In case of perfect monitoring, there is no need 
to incentive professors and resources should be devoted to incentive universities. In case 
of non-monitoring the agency should use a mix of instruments aimed at motivating both 
professors and universities. Devoting all resources to direct economic incentives to 
professors would not be efficient. 
 
Second, the public agency must design the personal incentives to professors considering 
the net income received by professors for their research activities relative to the income 
they can get in doing corporate consulting. If the differences are very large, small 
personal incentives will have a negligible impact on research activities. 
 
Third, when assigning resources across universities, the public agency should distribute 
them asymmetrically, favoring those universities that have higher skilled professors for   22
doing research. However, the public agency should also incentive those universities 
which are not so interested in research (professors in that university could be as skilled 
as professors at other universities but their university is not interested in their professors 
conducting research). 
 
Fourth, the previous recommendations will be useless if universities, for a given level of 
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